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ABSTRACT: In 2015–16 in Valle d’Aosta – a small autonomous region in northwestern Italy – some local 
politicians entered into dialogue with each other and the population on the suitability of a complementary 
currency in the regional territory. Despite the willingness of the promoters, the complementary currency 
was not launched in the end, partly for contingent reasons (regarding, inter alia, the definition of new po-
litical priorities and alliances), partly because of issues that were structural in nature: i.e. lack of structural 
embeddedness hindering collective action, inter-group ties and personal trust; and a low degree of institu-
tional trust and of institutional transparency. Taking this case into account, this article aims to deepen un-
derstanding of the socio-institutional conditions that may favor or, on the contrary, hinder monetary inno-
vation in a local context. Specifically, we highlight the lack of compactness of the proposal – concerning 
objectives, timing and territorial scale of implementation – and the emergence of a logic of competition 
with other political and entrepreneurial actors of the territory as the main weaknesses of the project. Fur-
thermore, we show that a balance between the public and private spheres, leading to a heterophile and 
polycentric network, is needed in order to facilitate the implementation of a complementary currency. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Scientists feel lucky when they find new topics in the course of researching some-
thing else. It is a kind of minor version of the serendipity effect: not quite the same as 
an unplanned discovery, but perhaps an old question calling to be looked at from an 
original perspective. When dealing with complementary currency (hereafter CC), this 
might happen. Thus, in this article we depict CC as a specific type of social innovation, 
and as a subject through which it is possible to observe several mechanisms underpin-
ning success or failure in designing social novelties. In other words, CC is a relevant top-
ic per se, but it is also an analytical gateway to observe something else. 
Against this background, the article aims to understand why the project of introduc-
ing a CC did not lead to the implementation of a concrete tool. Therefore, we try to ex-
tend the literature in two main respects. First, we observe the reasons why the CC pro-
ject might emerge within a local community (the problem of emergence). Second, we 
investigate the reasons why a CC – as an organizational novelty – might take root or 
not (the problem of the engraftment). The first aim is easier dealt with than the second 
one. Yet, the second has been gaining growing importance in recent years.  
In the wide stream of literature about social innovation, a large number of scholars 
have attempted to outline factors fostering the social “construction of something nei-
ther present nor anticipated by anyone in the population” (Padgett and Powell 2012, 
1). While neglecting to truly answer the question about the origin of innovation, these 
scholars have been able to explain selection and diffusion of the innovation, by apply-
ing social network theories and the analytical toolkit of new institutionalism. More pre-
cisely, efforts have been made to lay out the constellation of different kinds of ties 
within specific topologies of networks that shape how social innovations spread. 
Alongside this, we address how some institutional environments can support the wide-
spread propensity to innovate; i.e. in certain territorial and social contexts actors tend 
to have a mixture of beliefs, preferences, and resources that can legitimate and en-
courage the search for innovation (Powell and DiMaggio 2012).      
By contrast, we know less about why social innovations fail. Surely a majority of re-
search in social sciences is skewed towards social phenomena which establish them-
selves due to a sort of heuristic instinct (i.e. it matters what survives), to empirical op-
portunities (i.e. positive cases are easier to access), and to an individualistic reduction-
ism (i.e. extreme outcomes such as failure are mainly idiosyncratic matters). Therefore, 
we still lack overarching explanations of unsuccessful processes. In more recent years a 
number of papers have moved in this direction (Schrank and Whitford 2011), thereby 
addressing the embeddedness of failures. According to this perspective, sociology 
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helps with understanding how sociological variables about social networks and institu-
tional environments can make more or less likely the risk of failure of social innova-
tions. From this perspective, scholars have established a general framework of network 
failure, which can be useful to our purposes. Actually, a framework of network failure is 
a nuanced answer to a typical dilemma concerning collective action: how and why 
people cooperate with each other or establish collaborative arrangements in order to 
“foster learning, innovation, and cost-reduction and thereby to the benefit of the vari-
ous participants” (Ibid., 152). In this regard, it has been pointed out that a good mix be-
tween weak and strong ties is needed to keep opportunism under control and to miti-
gate altruism, thereby giving rise to a stable setting for cooperation (Uzzi 1997; Grano-
vetter 1985).  As we have stated, we take on this call which is only partially fulfilled, by 
analysing the process through which the effort to establish a CC failed. 
In 2015–16 in Valle d’Aosta – a small autonomous region in northwestern Italy – 
some local politicians entered into dialogue with each other and the population on the 
suitability of a CC in the regional territory. The initial proposal was gradually elaborated 
through internal discussions within the political movements and in community meet-
ings, also involving experts and discussing other experiences on monetary innovation. 
Hence, the first stages of the public discussion dealt with both social and institutional 
issues concerning the attempt to define a successful path for introducing a CC in the 
regional territory. Despite the willingness of the promoters, in the end the project was 
not launched. According to our hypothesis, this process was interrupted for two main 
reasons: i) the first pertains to contingent factors, i.e. the definition of new political 
priorities and alliances; and ii) the second relates mainly to structural issues, i.e. lack of 
embeddedness hindering collective action, inter-group ties, and personal trust; and a 
low degree of institutional trust and institutional transparency.  
By taking into account this specific case, which will be reconstructed in its most im-
portant phases using an in-depth case study approach, this paper aims to deepen un-
derstanding of the socio-institutional conditions that may favour or, on the contrary, 
hinder monetary innovations in a local context. Intertwining empirical analysis of the 
case and that of literature on the subject, we will focus on the role of the political, cog-
nitive, cultural, and relational factors in fostering CC adoption. First, we will identify: (i) 
the set of individual and collective actors involved in the currency proposal and design; 
(ii) their objectives – both stated (e.g. specific goals of the currency) and implicit (e.g. 
political legitimacy) – for participation in the project; and (iii) their mutual connections. 
Second, we will highlight the process of public and political consultation put into place 
to achieve the intended outcome, focusing on what kind of tangible and intangible re-
sources were endorsed by the actors, including strategic use of the symbolic dimension 
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(e.g. the call for community identity, local particularism, and a response to the partial 
collapse of the privileges associated with the autonomous statute). Third, we will focus 
on the logic of action of the main political actors, i.e. whether they were oriented to-
wards fostering the innovation propensity of local society, or whether they tried to get 
control over the CC experiment in order to enlarge their power connections. 
Briefly speaking, we will try to show that comunitaristic explanations are misleading. 
More precisely, establishing a social innovation, such as a CC, might require avoiding 
both the network failures of overembedded situations, and that of lack of relation-
ships, which are likely to be found where arms-length ties prevail (see Section 2). A 
mixture of strong and weak ties, and a combination of instrumental and altruistic ori-
entations might be better suited for helping bottom-up institutionalization processes. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we will introduce the theoretical 
background of the topic of CC. We will then briefly present the logic of our case study 
and some methodological aspects. Afterwards, we will address the empirical case. 
Broader suggestions concerning the social anatomy of the way CC functions will be 
provided in the conclusions.   
 
 
2. When a dollar is more than a dollar: a modest review of complementary 
currencies 
 
As we have already stated, in the article we depict CCs as a specific form of social in-
novation (Blanc and Fare 2012; Barbera, Dagnes, Salento, and Spina 2016). According 
to the Stanford Graduate School of Business, social innovation is – briefly – the process 
of deploying and developing an effective and innovative solution to social needs or the 
process of identifying new social needs1. In this regard, CCs might be conceived as a 
concrete way to reject the mere instrumental concept of “money that reduces it to a 
simple tool of market exchange,” in order to establish a form of money which can serve 
broader needs. Consistently, understanding CCs requires assuming “a socio-economic 
and institutional approach to money, its uses and the practice associated with it.” (Fare 
and Ahmed 2017, 861). Thus, analytical toolkits of the orthodox economy are not 
enough to grasp the multifaceted aspects of this phenomenon (Fare and Ahmed 2017, 
Granovetter 2017). According to the general premise of these assumptions, people are 
able, to some extent, to invent their “own forms of currency, earmark money in ways 
that baffle market theorists, incorporate money into personalized webs of friendship, 
 
1 https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/centers-initiatives/csi; website visited in February 2020. 
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family relations” (Zelizer 2017, 2). Thus, despite the idea that “a dollar is a dollar is a 
dollar,” people identify, classify, organize, use, and create money in various ways 
(Ibid.). Some of these various uses might be critical towards the market; some other 
uses might embrace the logic of market exchange: all of them add some elements to 
the pure, impersonal and abstract dynamics of spending and savings.  
From this perspective, we can define CCs as “specific units (or systems) of account-
ing that complement official currencies; they have been developed by groups of indi-
viduals, enterprises, local authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), associa-
tions, foundations, etc. that have set up trading networks in delimited territories, with 
a view to accounting for and regulating the exchange of goods and services” (Fare and 
Ahmed 2017, 847). 
In the last few years, the literature on CCs has grown in many directions, mainly as a 
result of some critical remarks towards neo-liberal orders that have circulated. After 
the 2008 financial crisis, several scholars illustrated the growing difficulties of aligning 
the economy and society, which many rich countries have been experiencing from the 
end of the golden age of Fordism onwards (Crouch 2011). More precisely, coordinated 
market economies have been facing growing difficulties in reconciling economic dyna-
mism with social cohesion, whereas liberal market economies have been dealing with 
new obstacles in combining economic innovation with promises of upward mobility 
(Trigilia 2008; Hall and Soskice 2001). At the same time, it has been pointed out that 
from the structural difficulties of old and consolidated models of capitalism a new dy-
namism has arisen from the bottom up in the search for original economic practices 
that boost participation, social inclusion, economic well-being, and bonds of reciprocity 
between actors. CCs might fit into this dynamism concerning local communities. This 
does not imply that CCs are as new as we might think: some examples date back to the 
19th century (Fare and Ahmed 2017). Yet, we claim that there has been an increasing 
diffusion in terms of the territories involved, and a differentiation of CCs with regard to 
the monetary forms (i.e. scrip, manual, electronic, smart card), the connection with 
other actors (i.e. banks, small business entities and associations, third sector groups, 
grassroots movements, local public institutions), and the type of exchange (i.e. busi-
ness-to-business or peer-to-peer) (Ibid.). Furthermore, and perhaps above all, the 
aforementioned attention that social sciences have been newly paying to economic 
practises from below (i.e. a sharing and participating economy) have made CCs deeply 
attractive from an analytical point of view. Briefly speaking, CCs are a rising phenome-
non and social sciences raise new questions about CCs. That being said, we assess that 
the literature on CCs addresses three main streams: i) the mechanisms through which 
CCs emerge; ii) the mechanisms through which concrete CC cases establish themselves 
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and scale up; and iii) the outcomes or effects concrete CC cases can have on society 
and the economy, mainly at the local level. 
With regard to the origin of a new experiment with CCs, in the literature we mainly 
find a combination of two orders of motivations for actions that CCs might rely upon. 
The first order is deeply instrumental and concerns failures of monetary markets and 
policy. From this perspective, scholars argue that CCs emerge when some creative ini-
tiators try to set up a (temporary) means of facing cash-flow difficulties, basically to 
overcome a cash-flow shortage. CCs that emerge to extend exchanges of the goods and 
services of a local production system suffering a shortfall of domestic demand can also 
be traced back to an instrumental origin. In both cases, we notice how an instrumental 
origin of CCs might need a constellation of innovative behaviours and the existence of 
local identities that strengthen their orientation towards supporting the local economy. 
This helps to establish mutual recognition and a mid-trust range. The second order of 
motivations, by contrast, is rooted mainly in expressive critical elements. In this regard, 
CCs’ origin is viewed as a symptom of a radical critique of the globalized capitalist 
economy which fosters an individualistic market society devaluating “social ends that 
interfere with devotion of social resources to the achievement of individuals goals” 
(Kuenne 2014, 8). From this perspective, CCs are seen as a way to introduce into eco-
nomic processes collective actions and social aims, which go beyond the individual 
maximization of profit. In this respect, scholars depict CCs as an effort to replace (at 
least partly) mainstream capitalism, thus giving rise to an enduring common good 
(Ostrom 1990). In the extreme version, CCs might connect to broader protest activities 
engaging with degrowth. Thus, CCs are not conceived as a means to accelerate the 
cash-flow. Rather, they help to make market exchanges less frenzied.  
With regard to the factors and mechanisms through which CCs can take root at the 
local level and then scale up, scholars have been dealing with several puzzling issues. 
We have claimed that a tendency towards diffusion of CCs has been noted. By this, 
scholars mean a type of horizontal diffusion (i.e. the fact that the number of CCs is 
growing all over the world) that we will not address in this article. Here, we mainly look 
at the essays which have scrutinized how concrete CC cases spread through a territorial 
area and/or within a certain local community, which we might refer to as “vertical dif-
fusion.” It is a challenging task to understand which sociological studies on how phe-
nomenon spread might provide some useful insights. Some years ago, sociological 
analyses of diffusion moved away from classical contagion models: “rather than target-
ing aggregate parameters, such as the overall adoption rate, researchers began to fo-
cus on individual processes” (Palloni 2001, 79). The new models shift their attention to 
actors who are to some extent decision-makers, acting under the influence of social 
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factors, of the decisions that are going to be taken by other actors they are in contact 
with, and of the material constraints they have to contend with. The combination of 
these factors might suggest a realistic representation of “individuals experienc[ing] 
transition from the state of non-adopter to adopter” (Ibid., 81). From this perspective, 
the choice of joining a collective action depends on the conditions associated with indi-
vidual positions, and on the network in which one is embedded. More precisely, we are 
postulating a type of belief-formation mechanism “which states that the number of in-
dividuals who perform a certain act signal to others the likely value or necessity of the 
act, and this signal will influence other individuals' choice of action” (Hedström and 
Swedberg 1996, 295). On the fundamental level of this mechanism, the emergence of a 
collective movement or the choice to jump into CC exchanges are all analogous (Ibid.). 
Now, accordingly, we can claim two types of networks affect the flows of decisions to 
support a CC: a micro-level network, linking nearby actors together (i.e. neighbour-
hoods or normal friends, small entrepreneurs or retailers, grassroots activists); and a 
meso-level network, linking individuals with the pioneers or founders of the CC. Either 
network influences both the speed and the pattern at which a CC diffuses. To sum up, 
in the literature we can implicitly identify a multilevel network approach through which 
CC diffusion processes can been explained (Hedström, Sandell, and Stern 2000). In this 
respect, some general findings can be drawn. A communitarian group is not an essen-
tial precondition per se for a CC to embed itself at the local level. On the contrary, oth-
er structural conditions are more likely to affect this process. First, a broad collective 
group made up of internally well-connected cliques, which are linked by weak ties, is 
more likely to spread a social innovation such as a CCs. The outcome of the process is 
by no means definite even in the presence of those conditions. However, at the very 
first stage, a social morphology made up of cliques is not easy to penetrate, but it 
might guarantee a stable and consistent flow of information, and it might reinforce the 
average tendency to become an adopter. When convincing a member of a clique, the 
entire clique is indeed likely to mutate. Second, it is important that promoters and ear-
ly users of CCs be actors with a high level of social recognition and reputation, who can 
mediate between different cliques and promote enforceable trust.                   
Concerning the effect that CCs might have on local society and the economy, we can 
pinpoint an ongoing debate; however, principles and methods for evaluating CCs have 
not yet been defined, and there is no clear effort to define them. As for many other ex-
amples of social innovations, it is difficult to standardize an evaluation design and to 
gather reliable data on the outcome of CCs. Moreover, the “critical framework” often 
feeding CCs (see above) is not sympathetic towards the obsession for evaluation, ac-
cording to which something is right so long it works (Busso 2015). Therefore, we do not 
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expect evaluation standards to emerge from the social groups giving rise to new CC ex-
periments. Scholars, for their part, have difficulties in defining diachronic comparative 
studies to estimate the economic and social impact of CCs. Nevertheless, we can find 
this topic in the literature. CCs are often presented as useful means to revitalize en-
dogenous economic tendencies (i.e. consumption taking place inside a local monetary 
and territorial area; resources for new outlets and jobs, see Fare and Ahmed 2017, 
856), and to foster local micro-entrepreneurship. As for the CCs’ social effects, three 
main factors have often been underscored: i) CCs might broaden market access. This is 
obviously a relevant phenomenon from an economic point of view, but it has been de-
picted as an indicator of democratization of the economic life and a way to limit social 
exclusion. ii) CCs help to reshape the relationship among market-reciprocity-solidarity, 
thus enlarging the area of influence of reciprocity and solidarity. iii) CCs help to estab-
lish a gift economy framework. This aspect entails more than how concrete exchanges 
of goods and services take place. While stimulating a gift economy, in fact, CCs reshape 
general cognitive orientations towards the economic sphere, thus fostering the idea 
that goods and services are not just exchanged for value through anonymous and spot 
dynamics. Rather, they can also be exchanged through a number of principles concern-
ing social norms and use-values, thus establishing social relationships, sharing and be-
longing.     
As we have seen in the introduction, in the broad stream of literature on CCs we 
note in part a selective bias, according to which mainly successful cases have been in-
vestigated. Therefore, studies on CCs have produced a better understanding of the fac-
tors which a well-established CC relies upon: a mixture of instrumental and expressive 
orders of motivation for action from which a CC originates; a favourable relational 
structure which accelerates its diffusion; some positive outcomes both at the social 
and the economic levels which can redound to the CC, thus reinforcing institutionaliza-
tion. In contrast, this article attempts to explain why a project to establish a new CC did 
not materialize, starting from an empirical case study. We thus frame the article in the 
rising sociology of failure (Schrank and Whitford 2011). It seems reasonable to focus on 
the social and relational structure: unless otherwise stated, a complex mix of motiva-
tions is always present at the aggregate level, whereas social relational structure may 
vary, thus shaping in different ways the outcome of any collective action process. Let 
us conclude the theoretical background with some insights concerning how relational 
factors can have negative effects, which we draw upon in order to define our research 
question.  
The idea that relational resources always have positive effects is misleading (Portes 
1998). Social networks can trap people inside them, while fostering territorial and so-
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cial segregation and labour market concentration. We recall two fundamental papers 
delivering a scheme that demarcates features, functions and consequences of relation-
al embeddedness. When conducting research on better-dress apparel firms in New 
York City, Uzzi (1997) laid out a distinction between under-embeddedness – when 
market transactions prevail, and there is little involvement of relational mechanisms; 
and over-embeddedness – when transactions are firmly rooted in social ties. Embed-
dedness “yields positive returns only up to a threshold point. Once this threshold is 
crossed, returns from embeddedness become negative” (Ibid., 694). In other words, 
relying upon social ties might be useful to avoid an excess of competition. Yet, relying 
on social ties only might repress innovation. “Optimal networks are not composed of 
either all embedded ties or all arm's-length ties, but integrate the two” (Ibid.), so a 
network might not be useful in supporting social action when it is only composed of ei-
ther deeply embedded ties or unstable arm’s-length ties. Likewise, while investigating 
several immigrant groups of small entrepreneurs, Granovetter (1995) pointed out that 
groups relying on heterogeneous relational resources, including social capital in the 
form of both solidarity and reciprocity, are more likely to be successful. In fact, their 
internally cohesive family groups have a high capacity for bonding with each other and 
intercepting external resources through non-redundant ties. As such, they can guaran-
tee a good mix of endogenous solidarity and longer ties, resulting in a situation midway 
between individualism and unconditional altruism, which promotes economic perfor-
mance and cooperative action (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990; Granovetter 1995; Burt 
2000; Storti 2014). 
 
 
3. The proposal of a complementary currency in Valle d’Aosta 
 
The points addressed in the previous section will now be applied to a specific case 
study concerning the recent project of conceiving and implementing a CC in Valle 
d’Aosta, a small region in northern Italy.2 The chosen case is unique because it is not, 
 
2 The analysis, based on original empirical material, has a twofold objective: on the one hand, the recon-
struction of the socio-territorial context in which the phenomena investigated took place, including the 
particular regional opportunity structure; on the other hand, the specific political, relational, and cognitive 
elements affecting the chances of success in CC implementation. Empirical data include: (i) the publicly 
available documentation on the case, including political statements and interviews, newspaper articles, 
and local television reports. The documentation was collected through a systematic press and media re-
view conducted over the years 2015 and 2016 of the local newspapers (i.e. the weekly magazines La Vallée 
Notizie and La Gazzetta Matin, and the local section of the daily newspaper La Stampa), and the television 
services produced by the regional news programme (TG3R) on initiatives relating to the introduction of CC; 
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properly speaking, a case of the decline of an existing CC, a topic to which some other 
studies have been devoted.3 Literature actually shows that the majority of CCs “around 
the world (…) typically die out in a year or subsist as small and marginal” (Gomez and 
Helmsing 2008). The process observed in Valle d’Aosta is instead preliminary, since it 
concerns a political proposal and debate on the introduction of a CC that did not sub-
sequently materialize. Through this sort of zero degree of failure, we will thus face the 
question of how certain social, political and institutional conditions influence the re-
ception capacity of a territory for such proposals. The aspects that emerge will have 
value primarily for the case analysed, but they will also allow us to develop some more 
general considerations. 
First, let us turn our attention to the context. Valle d’Aosta is the smallest, least 
populous and least densely populated region in Italy.4 It is an alpine area, with an en-
tirely mountainous territory divided into 74 municipalities, of which only one, the re-
gional capital Aosta, exceeds 5,000 inhabitants (with about 34,000 in all).5 Among the 
remaining municipalities, 27 have fewer than 500 inhabitants and another 15 are be-
tween 500 and 1,000. About half of these small municipalities are located above a 
thousand meters of altitude, thus configuring a dispersed demographic fabric across 
medium-high mountains, characterized by progressive depopulation and aging of the 
 
(ii) the direct involvement in some of the public initiatives organized to present and promote the project 
(according to the principles of participant observation and observant participation, see for example 
Moeran 2009). Specifically, the authors participated as speakers in a public initiative to present the project 
for the introduction of CC, and they attended, as spectators, another public initiative and an electoral rally 
on the same topic; and (iii) semi-structured interviews with key informants, selected by judgemental sam-
pling based on evidence from documentary sources. The interviews were conducted in two phases: the 
first phase concerned previous empirical investigations in the same area and focused on the political, eco-
nomic and institutional characteristics of the regional context, while the second phase was specifically de-
voted to the CC topic. In detail, this second section of interviews aimed to reconstruct the micro-relational 
and cognitive factors affecting whether and how the case of CC might take hold or fail. The first phase took 
place from November 2012 to April 2013 and from April to July 2019 (indicated as “Cn_VdA” – Context Val-
le d’Aosta – in the article); the second phase took place from June to September 2019 (referred to as 
“Pn_VdA” – Proposer Valle d’Aosta – below). A total of 12 interviews were conducted, involving local poli-
ticians, journalists, entrepreneurs, and public officials. Interviews lasted about one and a half hours on av-
erage, and were transcribed verbatim and then coded. The corpus of interviews was analysed compara-
tively in order to bring out ideal-typical tendencies or representation. 
3 See for example the essays on the rise and collapse of the Argentinian exchange network Red de Trueque 
by North (2007) and Gomez (2008; 2012). 
4 The region has about 127 thousand inhabitants, equal to 2.1% of the Italian population, and it measures 
3,263 km2 (1.1% of the Italian surface). Its density is therefore about 39 inhabitants per km2, while the Ital-
ian average is almost 200. Source: Istat (2011). 
5 Source: Istat (2011). 
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remaining inhabitants. Consistent with these traits, from an economic point of view, 
Valle d’Aosta is in some ways a typical mountain system, where an overall good eco-
nomic performance is combined with production marginality. The region is character-
ized by, among other things, an average low level of market opening, a limited pres-
ence of high value-added sectors, and great importance of the economic activities in-
terconnected with the territory, primarily construction and tourism (cf. Dagnes and 
Storti 2015; Banca d’Italia 2019). These traits are indeed reflected in the regional en-
trepreneurial structure, which is made up of a low number of manufacturing activities 
with on average a low number of employees, mainly concentrated at the valley floor 
(Istat 2017a). A poorly developed private sector is counterbalanced by a hypertrophied 
public sector: Valle d’Aosta ranks first among Italian regions for the number of public 
employees per 1,000 inhabitants (Valle d’Aosta 91, Italian average 53) and public 
spending per capita per year (Valle d’Aosta 15,500€, Italian average 9,300€).6 This is 
mainly because of the special administrative status the region enjoys, with great politi-
cal autonomy and, for a long time, broad financial means. In fact, after the end of 
World War II, the region gained home rule, allowing some legislative, administrative 
and financial autonomy with respect to the national government because of its border 
position, and its cultural and linguistic specificities.  
From a financial point of view, the special status led to significant economic re-
sources becoming available for local political institutions, in particular from the early 
1980s to the end of the 2000s, thanks to legislation on the fiscal distribution between 
the State and Region and, following the completion of the European Single Market in 
1993, to the introduction of a monetary transfer from the central government for the 
lost regional revenue related to import VAT (Vesan 2012). Because of these huge eco-
nomic resources, the local political institutions have long been in the position of play-
ing a fundamental role in the regional economy (Dagnes and Storti 2015). As claimed 
by a key informant, “the regional government is the prime mover for everything… the 
dominus of the economic and institutional scene” (Int C4_VdA). This situation led to 
decades of high political stability, with a dominant local autonomist party – the Union 
Valdôtaine (UV) – that, according to many observers, created and maintained consen-
sus over time thanks in part to the particularistic distribution of resources and political 
patronage (Maltese 2007; Riccardo 1994; Riccarand 2010).  
Things have somewhat changed in recent years when, following the economic and 
financial crisis and the consequent national austerity policies, the agreements between 
State and Region were gradually changed. According to some estimates, in the last ten 
 
6 Source: Istat (2017b). 
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years regional financing has been nearly halved (Gheda 2017). Financial cuts have thus 
undermined the political stability of the system, leading to a fragmentation of the polit-
ical offerings. On the one hand, the dominant local party has split into numerous minor 
parties, led by former leaders of internal factions who have attempted personal politi-
cal achievement once the unity guaranteed by the redistribution of resources ceased. 
On the other hand, the national political parties have begun to gather some consensus 
in the region, partially eliminating the political specificity of the region. This fragmenta-
tion has led to the need to forge alliances between different political subjects and a 
certain difficulty in maintaining them over time. As a result, in the last ten years (from 
2008 to today) Valle d’Aosta has been governed by seven different political majorities, 
for a total of five different Presidents of the Region. 
In this economic and political context, the theme of a CC was addressed for the first 
time during the 2015 campaign for the municipal elections in the regional capital Aosta 
by the independent candidate for mayor of the Union Valdôtaine Progressiste party 
(UVP), a local autonomist party founded at the end of 2012 following a split of the Un-
ion Valdôtaine. The candidate – an intellectual figure, politically independent, although 
a strong supporter of autonomy and the son of a former President of the Region – in-
cluded the theme of a CC in his electoral programme. In the words of the candidate, 
this was partly a provocation because of the forced communal scale of the proposal, 
given the elections taking place, while the appropriate dimension – and, in a sense, the 
ideal one, given the characteristics of the context – would have been regional. Despite 
this limitation, the candidate thought it was appropriate to start talking about the tool, 
possibly with the idea of being able to raise it later on a regional scale. The political 
proposal hypothesized that part of the salary of municipal and/or regional employees 
could be converted and paid in CC, to be spent in a network of affiliated local economic 
activities. This was the first formulation: however, the proposer intended for the analy-
sis of technical details and feasibility to be entrusted to a commission of experts. 
Following the election result – with the success of another autonomist group led by 
the UV party, in coalition with a left-wing party – the proposal was temporarily tabled. 
But at the beginning of the following year, in 2016, interest in the project was raised 
again when it was revived by another local politician belonging to the autonomous left 
party Autonomie Liberté Participation Écologie (ALPE). ALPE was founded in 2010 by 
the union of two other autonomous movements, in turn resulting from previous splits 
of the Union Valdôtaine, and a Green local party. This new attention for the launching 
of a CC in Valle d’Aosta was carried out through some citizenship initiatives in the terri-
tory, aiming to present the project, its objectives and its possible effects in terms of lo-
cal development. The type of CC proposed and the economic actors involved were 
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about the same as in the previous year’s project, and in this case, as well, technical de-
tails would have been defined later. The public events met with some success and re-
ceived attention from the local media, which dedicated several newspaper articles and 
television reports to the topic.  
Despite this second flurry, after a few months regional political instability scattered 
the cards again, marking – at least for now – the end of the discussion on this project. 
In fact, in spring 2016 the municipal councillor of Aosta who was the first promoter of 
the local CC (P1) decided to abandon the UVP as a result of the party’s rise to the polit-
ical majority in the regional council together with the Union Valdôtaine.7 The following 
year ALPE, the party to which the second promoter of the project (P2) belongs, became 
in turn part of the regional majority following a motion of no-confidence against the 
Union Valdôtaine promoted by the UVP and some other autonomist parties. This ma-
jority lasted only a few months, however, before the umpteenth turnaround leading to 
a rapprochement between UVP and Union Valdôtaine who governed together until the 
2018 regional elections. Following the results of these last elections, won for the first 
time by the national party Lega,8 P1 has joined the Lega group in the municipal council 
in mid-2018, while P2 remained in the ALPE party and was nominated as a single can-
didate for the main local autonomist parties (Union Valdôtaine, UVP, ALPE and some 
others) in the 2019 European elections. 
Prolonged political unrest, therefore, seems to be at the origin of the undoing of the 
CC project in Valle d’Aosta. Although contingent political conditions are undoubtedly 
part of the explanation, we believe that some additional elements – on different ana-
lytical levels – deserve to be further highlighted. 
 
 
4. The unfulfilled path from proposal to design: some sand in the wheels 
 
We will concentrate now on two different groups of elements that have determined 
the weakness of the CC proposal in Valle d’Aosta, making the project unworkable for 
now. The first refers to the preliminary definition of the tool, while the second has to 
do with disinterest and opposition expressed in the political-institutional and socio-
economic context. 
 
7 Furthermore, as a result of this political rapprochement at the regional level, three founding members of 
the UVP party abandoned it and founded the latest autonomous local movement, called MOUVˈ. 
8 After the 2018 elections, the region was governed for some months by a regional council composed of 
the Lega (which held the Presidency), ALPE, and some other local parties. At the end of 2018, a motion of 
no-confidence against the Lega led the Union Valdôtaine, UVP and ALPE to the regional government. 
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Regarding the delineation of the proposal, a primary critical element has to do with 
the existence of two proponents, who approached the topic at different times, and 
with some substantial differences between them. P1 decided to introduce CC among 
the points of his municipal electoral campaign after a thorough intellectual examina-
tion. The study and analysis of the political and economic history of the region led him 
to believe that, in order to support local development, it was necessary to solve an ex-
isting lack of liquidity: 
A fundamental equation: the price multiplied by the quantity of output is equal to the 
money supply multiplied by the velocity of money. But we are not able to influence the 
supply of money (...). So society can collapse simply because there is not enough money. 
The question is: does the Valle d’Aosta have this kind of problem? In my opinion, yes. (...) 
We had a devastating situation following the procurement of the fiscal distribution in 
1981. It is a case of resource curse: when it is not controlled, an external resource me-
chanically destroys the entire production system. In 1990 this annuity corresponded to 
one-third of the public budget. This situation mechanically causes a phenomenon of po-
litical and moral corruption: if the local institution has an endowment equal to one-third 
of the budget that is completely independent of the quality of the administration, it will 
use the money to buy political consensus, neglecting investment and development. In 
2015 the system is on the rocks because the 2008 economic crisis and its consequences 
on the state-region agreements mean that suddenly there is no more cornucopia. The 
system has no more resources, there is a collapse of liquidity, the bubble deflates after 
more than thirty years of money continuously flowing. There may now be a chance to 
mitigate the effects of this liquidity bubble deflation (...) through a complementary cur-
rency system (Int P1_VdA). 
The CC introduction has therefore been identified by P1 as an innovative resolution 
of a specific territorial problem, and his proposal is based on a detailed analysis of the 
situation and an in-depth study of the topic. P2, instead, gets to the CC more directly, 
running into this tool following the P1 campaign: 
Everything started in the last municipal elections, in 2015. I had never heard of com-
plementary currencies, zero, (...) I had never heard of them before. The UVP party nomi-
nated this person (P1) who has a very strong personality, he had carte blanche in the 
election campaign, and he proposed this complementary currency. (...) I started to read a 
little, to inform myself, I saw that from a theoretical point of view there were many simi-
larities with my way of thinking. I found many interesting things in the concept of local 
currency, I saw it as something very practical (Int P2_VdA). 
While in the case of P1, therefore, the CC proposal constitutes the final step of a 
complex reasoning, for P2 it is instead a sort of starting point: he first becomes aware 
of the existence of the tool, finding it interesting, and then he develops reflections 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(1) 2020: 540-563, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p540 
  
554 
 
about the desirable effects of its concrete application in the regional territory. This dif-
ference in the path that led to sponsoring the adoption of CC is also reflected in a 
somewhat different conception of it and its objectives. For both P1 and P2 the primary 
purpose of the proposed CC is economic, i.e. the promotion and support of local devel-
opment: 
The idea is to introduce a complementary currency system that covers the lost pro-
duction gap due to the recession. (...) We could have the double positive effect of miti-
gating the violent effects of the crisis and favouring local entrepreneurship (Int P1_VdA). 
A complementary currency is a very useful tool for the economic promotion of territo-
ry, especially a territory that is disadvantaged like the Alpine area. If we pay part of the 
regional allowances in a local currency, with a local circuit of affiliated firms and shops, 
consumption will automatically increase and so we will help the local economy. We will 
ensure that this money remains in Valle d’Aosta, in our community, helping small and 
medium-sized local businesses, also providing more opportunities to those located in the 
less-favoured middle mountain areas. (…) The basic idea is: let's try to keep as much 
money as possible in our territory (Int P2_VdA). 
The economic effects expected by both proposers are therefore in line with the con-
tents of the ongoing debate on this topic, focused on the fostering of economic ex-
changes in the territory, the growth of domestic demand, and support for local entre-
preneurship (see Section 2). In addition to this, however, some social effects are also 
expected, and it is with regard to these aspects that some differences between the two 
proponents emerge, consistent with their own political and intellectual profiles. Ac-
cording to P2, with the CC it will be possible to strengthen local relational networks and 
curb the depopulation of mountain areas:  
Another goal is reinforcing social relations, because if you promote local consumption, 
people are then led to collaborating. There are so many cases of farms that are unable to 
sell their products to the restaurant that is on the other side of the road, because it has 
never been done or because there are long-standing conflicts between their families. If 
you encourage them to get in touch and exchange, you can solve these problems as well 
(Int P2_VdA). 
In our small mountain community, it is important to be able to keep the entire area 
liveable. Otherwise, the risk is that in ten or fifteen years we will have a sort of amuse-
ment park in the high mountain, only open in wintertime, and abandoned during the rest 
of the year. The middle mountain will disappear completely because it is now inhabited 
only by the elderly, we will have entire areas that will be populated only by very old peo-
ple. This has negative repercussions on the whole community, there will be environmen-
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tal and social problems. In my opinion, complementary currency can be an adequate tool 
to deal with these risks (Int P2_VdA). 
P1, on the other hand, sets the CC social goals by connecting them directly to the 
theme of regional identity. From this point of view, his proposal fits into a debate that 
is very much alive in the region, also because of its political exploitation over time in 
order to justify the autonomous status, but which is often made up of slogans with 
nostalgic or demanding tones (see interviews Int C3_VdA; Int C5_VdA). In the inten-
tions of P1, CC could instead help to overcome the dependency on excessive public aid 
by enhancing the strengths of the regional system, thus constituting a new symbol  of 
identity for the territory and embodying the most positive values of Valle d'Aosta par-
ticularism: 
Currency has a very strong identity significance: it is one of the attributes of sover-
eignty, it is a very strong glue. The smaller you are, the more you are stretched here and 
there, and the more important it is to have symbols of production and wealth. Not just 
historical symbols, but living things. My currency means that I produce. The dream was 
to make it possible to identify ourselves with a symbol to be proud of. (...) One of the in-
tentions was that it would become a moment of union with respect to different identity 
factors that exist in the region (Int P1_VdA). 
The misalignment of the paths of the proponents, in the timing of their proposal, 
and in the social aim they attribute to the CC, constitutes a first critical aspect for the 
conception and implementation of the tool. This does not mean that these types of dif-
ferences always represent an obstacle or a disadvantage, since they could also enrich 
the project, supporting it over time and with different audiences. In other words, dif-
ferences can trigger positive effects, favouring an enlargement of the initial proposal 
and its easier diffusion. In the specific case, however, this preliminary fragmentation 
weakened the entire proposal, preventing the formulation of a unitary project and 
arousing friction between those involved. In this regard, it is possible to identify at least 
three problem areas. First is recognition of the authorship of the proposal. Although P2 
clearly stated that the initial idea originated from P1, his subsequent behaviour gener-
ated in P1 a sense of theft of the proposal, such that the relationship between the two 
proponents became less smooth, compromising possible future collaborations: 
The feeling is that (P2), having seen a good idea, decided to make it his workhorse and 
being unable to claim primacy, since I had been the proponent of this measure during 
the 2015 elections, he involved me substantially to legitimize the idea. Predation, one 
can say (Int P1_VdA). 
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Second is the scale of the proposal. As mentioned above, P1 floated the idea of a 
municipal CC when he was a candidate for the municipal elections. At the same time, 
however, he was aware that this was not the appropriate dimension for the project 
and he had hope of scaling it up to the regional level. 
It is true – (P2) was right – that the ideal scale would have been the region. I was the 
first to say it, but I was a candidate for mayor in Aosta. The city is already large enough to 
do something, but it is true that the right scale would have been the regional one (Int 
P1_VdA). 
The takeover by P2, which could have facilitated this shift, actually has not proved to 
be functional, both for the aforementioned personal grudge between the proponents 
and for the impression of vagueness about the tool that emerged in the meantime. The 
awareness of not reasoning on the “right” dimensional scale has indeed led P1 to not 
dwell too much on the CC practical details, postponing their conception to a later mo-
ment. This lack of concreteness has most likely been perceived by the audience of po-
tentially interested parties, thus fuelling a generic public debate in which the practical 
aspects of implementation have been neglected. The imprint of this debate remained 
abstract, thus hindering the idea of CC as a tangible tool even when P2 tried to shift the 
project to a regional scale. 
Third is the specific political position of the proposers. P1 was an independent can-
didate of a party from which he distanced himself a few months after the elections. 
Since he had carte blanche in defining the points of his political programme, the CC ini-
tiative was – and was also perceived as – entirely individual. P2, on the other hand, is a 
well-integrated member of his party, but his interest in CC was nevertheless expressed 
primarily at the individual level. According to some observers, the lack of initial in-
volvement of the party depended simply on P2’s personal enthusiasm, while according 
to others it was a political accreditation strategy. Whatever the reason, the result was 
the perception that the proposal was from two individuals instead of from two political 
movements, belonging to a common area – something that would have strengthened 
the legitimacy of the project.  
This last aspect allows us to provide some reflections on the second group of ele-
ments that have contributed to the failure of the CC design in Valle d’Aosta, that is, the 
poor reception shown by the context. The insufficient interaction between the individ-
ual and the collective levels described above led to a lukewarm welcome by the parties 
of both proposers, hampering further development of the project. 
At the beginning, I dealt with this proposal quite individually. I am part of a political 
party, but this is not an issue that my movement fully supported (…). But I am autono-
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mous in thinking and acting, so I organized a whole series of meetings on this topic. (…) 
This is very understandable: the proposal was born extemporaneously and I carried it out 
alone, so it is normal that it was not welcomed by everyone, even just for tactical and 
political reasons. If the proposal had been made after a political debate, after a debate 
within the party, it probably would have been more supported. Instead, first the idea 
was born and then it was shared: if I had been in the regional council I would have acted 
the same way, I would have snubbed it too (Int P2_VdA). 
In many empirical cases, a proposal coming from individuals to introduce a CC has 
been successful, since it expresses a bottom-up request intercepting a widespread 
need. This proposal can then be endorsed by political movements and local institu-
tions, which seek to work to implement or facilitate the adoption of the tool. In this 
specific case, however, the political affiliation of the proponents, combined with their 
acting on this point more as individuals than as party members, has meant that the 
project was not accepted and supported on a collective level. 
A second element of weakness regarding the poor reception of the context has to do 
with the lack of coordination with other similar initiatives being developed in the re-
gion:9 
While we were setting up our proposal from a theoretical and intellectual point of 
view, another complementary currency called Valdex was being born. Behind Valdex 
there were people who were afraid that our idea would put their currency in the back-
ground. In fact, their currency did not work very well; this is also because in my opinion 
the complementary currency must be public (Int P2_VdA). 
I proposed this thing and a series of people came to me quite brutally: “But how can 
you allow yourself to talk about complementary currency?” Because there was a com-
mittee for Valdex of which I was not aware. Some of these people thought I wanted to 
prey on their idea. We quarrelled, I must admit, and each went his own way. (...) We 
separated without having any agreement; they didn't go ahead with their project (Int 
P1_VdA). 
Also in this respect, what could have been a possible synergy has instead become an 
obstacle. Although the CC project has as a priority, in the words of its proponents, the 
support of local entrepreneurship, in real life a logic of competition between public and 
private initiatives was triggered. On the one hand, the political sponsors did not con-
nect with other projects taking place in the area, thus displacing with their proposal 
those who were planning to invest in a similar project. On the other hand, these pri-
 
9 The Valdex project is part of the Sardex circuit, a very successful CC that came into being in Sardinia in 
2010, which is based on a mutual credit system and aims to promote economic exchanges between local 
companies, following a business-to-business and business-to-employees model (see Sartori and Dini 2016). 
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vate actors did not perceive the interest shown by the political sphere as an opportuni-
ty to be exploited, for example to include local institutions within the business-to-
business network they were planning: 
Valdex is essentially a currency unit between companies, the public sector does not 
enter into it. I told them that in my opinion they were wrong, because it is not a competi-
tion; if by chance they had succeeded in including in the Valdex circuit the public admin-
istration, as producer and service provider, this would have been a colossal boost, it 
would have given greater credibility to their project (Int P1_VdA). 
A certain distance and gap in trust emerge here between the regional public and the 
private spheres. The peculiarities of the Valle d’Aosta economic-institutional context, 
characterized by an oversized public sector that has stifled private initiative (see Sec-
tion 3), can contribute to explaining the difficulty in starting a fruitful dialogue between 
the people involved. The absence of trust appears to neutralize any possible positive 
effects deriving from the proliferation of different projects and proposals in the territo-
ry, thus undermining potential cooperation between local actors. 
Finally, a further aspect to consider is the extent to which the CC theme in Valle 
d’Aosta is joined to some political issues specific to the territory. From a political and 
institutional point of view, in fact, the CC introduction does not have a neutral meaning 
in Valle d'Aosta. The special autonomous status of the region has been accompanied 
over time, both internally and outside the region, by a debate about the powers con-
ferred to local institutions and the limits of these powers, in the search for a balance 
between regional self-government and conservation of the prerogatives of the national 
state. In this frame, money creation takes on a further meaning compared to other ar-
eas, raising fears of a request for independence and leading to political manipulation. 
Although this aspect was not part of the intentions of the proposers, as they stated in 
the interviews,10 some observers emphasized it, thus distorting the debate about the 
wide-ranging implications of the introduction of a CC in Valle d'Aosta. This element, to-
gether with those mentioned above, weakened the proposal of a local CC, preventing 
the project from developing in the region. 
 
 
 
 
10 Cf. the following pieces of interviews: “When you talk about complementary money, everyone thinks it 
is a question of exit from the Eurozone, and the press has presented it in this sense. I don't think this at all, 
nor do I think of some form of micro-nationalism” (Int P2_VdA); “The proposal was mine and I had no in-
tention of making it the tool of identity extremism” (Int P1_VdA). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this article we have assumed CCs to be a specific kind of social innovation as they 
lead to an intersection between social aspects and economic processes (e.g. they are 
tools to purchase and sustain local development and to enhance mutual recognition 
and relational trust). In so doing, CCs aim to meet social needs in a better way, as well 
as to establish new interconnections between economic activities and social founda-
tions. This high potential for innovation was present in the case we have investigated, 
but it was unable to come to fruition. From this perspective, let us summarize the main 
findings of the article, according to which two main orders of reasons prevented the CC 
implementation in Valle d’Aosta: the first one pertains to how the tool was conceived 
by the proposers, the second one relates to the factors concerning the socio-economic 
context of the small region.  
First, we have shown that the projects of the two main proposers, although actually 
perceived as a unique proposal, diverge with respect to some key issues. Therefore, it 
is relevant to point out how the two projects reflect different ways of figuring out the 
main CC outcomes (see Section 2). While for both of the proposers the CC was mainly a 
useful tool to support local development, thus sharing an economic purpose, the social 
goals partially differ: the strengthening of local social relations, on the one hand, and 
the materialization of some issues concerning local identity and local exceptionalism on 
the other. Furthermore, CC effectiveness was jeopardized by the territorial level to 
which it should be applied, with a confusing oscillation between the municipal and re-
gional scales, which is a typical feature of such a small region where different existing 
political levels tend to collapse into each other. In sum, we can argue that a CC project 
is more likely to succeed when it institutionalizes itself as a means of supporting local 
development and as a way to enforce local cooperation and social inclusion. Therefore, 
it is relevant for a CC project to be multidimensional. However, in our case, the “second 
dimension” of the CC (an instrument to build up networks or to reinforce local identity) 
became a matter of potential conflict, thus decreasing its strength. 
Second, some specific features of the context hindered the project. From one side, 
the project did not succeed in gaining collective relevance within the political arena, 
remaining a matter of “personal” consensus and leadership, as is often the case in a 
context having some features of the so called “local community.” From the other side, 
the CC project was not able to get in touch with other private economic initiatives, 
which viewed it as a competitor instead of an opportunity.  
Thus, we can emphasize one last topic. As shown in the literature, local administra-
tions can play a key role in implementing CC experiences (Blanc and Fare 2013). In or-
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der for local governments to be able to carry out this support function successfully, 
however, a balance must exist between various public and private actors in the territo-
ry. In the case we presented, the hypertrophic dimension of the public institutional ac-
tors, the high density of their interconnectional and mutual control, the high territorial 
and social contiguity might have prevented the formation of a heterophile and poly-
centric network orbiting around the CC project. Hence, this project has suffered both 
from a selective under-embeddedness and over-embeddedness, being rooted in the 
political sphere at a relational and cognitive level and being external to other social 
spheres (i.e. entrepreneurial and professional networks) at a relational level: 
The system that has been created in Valle d'Aosta has generated a deep depression in 
the private sector, in particular as regards the entrepreneurial initiative. (...) Here the 
public actor permeates everything and suffocates everything else (Int P1_VdA). 
For this reason, the CC project was unable to connect through bridging and bonding 
social networks, ending up too relevant for the few and too irrelevant for the many. 
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